The War of 1812 Page 2

  Every year Indians came to Amherstburg, Fort St. Joseph, and other British posts to receive presents of food, clothing, guns, and ammunition from the British government, distributed through the Indian Department. This department’s officers, or agents, met Indians at the posts, visited their villages, and sometimes married Indian women. These men thus learned to understand Indians and their feelings. Their services were of great value to the British, for they attended Indian councils to listen and to give advice.

  Many Indians, including Tecumseh and the Prophet, did not like their dependence on the British, feeling that it undermined Indian culture and self-respect. But most could not give up the presents they were given because they had no other way to obtain these goods, particularly the weapons they needed to defend their lands against the Americans. Thus, when war came, Tecumseh and his followers, such as the Wyandot chiefs Roundhead and Split Log, felt they had no choice but to support the British. These Indians fought for their survival, not to maintain British rule over Canada.

  The Americans viewed British support of the Indians as a threat to their government’s policy of trying to force the Indians to give up their hunting lands and become farmers like American settlers. They believed that the British were stirring up the Indians to fight and supplying them with weapons for that purpose, endangering thousands of American lives. The British insisted, on the contrary, that they were trying to restrain the Indians from attacking American settlers. Although the Americans would never believe it, this was in fact true. The British did not want an Indian war because they knew it would increase the chances of conflict between Britain and the United States. Nonetheless, they could not stop all supplies to the Indians, for this would completely end their influence over them.

  The view of Fort George, Upper Canada (Niagara-on-the-Lake,

  Ontario), from Old Fort Niagara, c. 1805.

  [Courtesy of the Baldwin Room, Metropolitan Toronto Library.]

  In 1811, worried about Tecumseh’s efforts to unite the tribes, the Americans drastically increased their pressure on Indian lands. While Tecumseh was away in the south seeking Indian support for the confederacy, Governor Harrison marched an army into Indian territory near Prophetstown on the Tippecanoe River. He planned to disperse the Indians from this village because it was the centre of the Prophet’s influence. At dawn on November 7, the Prophet attacked the American troops. After several hours of intense fighting, the Indians were defeated and the Americans destroyed the town and its food supplies. The destruction of Prophetstown provoked more Indian attacks instead of ending the warfare, but Indian resistance continued to be weakened by disunity among the tribes.

  Americans in the West continued to believe that British contact with the Indians was encouraging the fierce frontier warfare in which settlers’ families were killed and their farms destroyed. This seemed to many to be reason enough to make war on Britain. Once the British were driven out of Canada, the Indians would have no allies to help them defend their lands. Furthermore, American settlement of Upper Canada could continue without hindrance or fear.

  This view has been called the land expansionist cause of the war. It was expressed most strongly in the South and West, particularly in Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky. In the election of 1810 for the United States Congress, many men with this view won seats from these states. Led by Henry Clay of Kentucky, they were aptly called “War Hawks” because they urged war against Britain.

  The War Hawks gave other reasons for wanting war, and these reflected what was happening on the Atlantic coast. There the main issue between Britain and the United States was “maritime rights.”

  MARITIME RIGHTS

  As we have seen, the Royal Navy was stopping neutral ships from entering ports under Napoleon’s control. Most of these ships were from the United States, and for this reason many Americans concluded that the British were simply interfering with their very profitable trade. Even worse in their eyes was the Royal Navy’s practice of stopping neutral ships at sea to search for contraband (goods which the British had declared illegal to trade with Europe) and deserters who had fled from the harsh and pitifully paid life on British warships. Many deserters took jobs on American ships, and the American government tried to protect them by giving them certificates of American citizenship. To British naval captains, however, these men had broken the law by deserting and could legally be returned to a British ship. Sometimes captains acted rashly and even impressed men who were native-born American citizens into service on British ships.

  From the Americans’ point of view, this arrogant British behaviour not only harmed their country’s commerce, it defied American law and authority. Many believed that their nation’s honour was being insulted and that war was the only way to make Britain respect American sovereignty.

  Americans have sometimes called the War of 1812 their “second war of independence.” Some felt strongly that the young nation had to go to war to prove it was truly independent. John Clopton of Virginia wrote:

  The outrages in impressing American seamen exceed all manner of description. Indeed the whole system of aggression now is such that the real question between Great Britain and the United States has ceased to be a question merely relating to certain rights of commerce . . . it is now clearly, positively, and directly a question of independence, that is to say, whether the United States are really an independent nation.1

  Patriotism and nationalism added further reasons to go to war.

  AMERICAN WEAKNESSES

  Not all Americans agreed on the need for war, and those who did could not agree on how to fight it. Differences of opinion affected their preparations and the conduct of the campaigns and in the end, these disagreements were important in preventing the conquest of Canada.

  The capture of Canada would require more and better troops than the Americans possessed in 1812. They had few regulars, that is, full-time, trained, professional soldiers. Even more serious was the poor quality of the army’s leadership. The highest ranking officers (generals) were either elderly veterans of the Revolutionary War (1775–83) or political appointees from the ranks of the militia. At the middle level (commanders of regiments) and the junior level, officers were hastily appointed, many because of their political connections. A large number of these officers lacked any military experience or training. To fight the war, the American government would have to rely on the militia, a force made up of male citizens of fighting age who were required to serve in defence of their country for short periods. Usually, they had no training as soldiers and knew nothing of military organization and discipline.

  As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the American president controlled the regulars but not the militia. He had to ask each state government to send its militia to fight. Many of these governments agreed with the militiamen in believing that they should not serve outside the state, and neither the president nor Congress had the authority to make them do so.

  Peter B. Porter of New York was elected to Congress in 1809

  and became a leader of the “War Hawks.” As chairman of the

  House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he prepared a report

  advocating preparation for war with Great Britain. In December

  1812, he and General Smyth fought a duel on Grand Island in the

  Niagara River, during which neither man was harmed. He led New

  York and Pennsylvania militiamen and Indians at the battles of

  Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane and during the siege of Fort Erie.

  After the war, he served as one of the commissioners who

  determined the boundary between Canada and the U.S.

  [Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society.]

  There were disagreements also between the main political parties (Federalist and Republican), between coastal and inland regions, and between northern and southern states. Federalists, most of whom opposed war with Britain, were strong in New York and New England. The southern and western stat
es were dominated by Republicans, most of whom favoured war. This party of President Madison also controlled Congress. But the party wanted war on the cheap, for its members were against a large army and navy and also opposed increasing taxes to pay for a war. As a result, Congress voted for only a small expansion of the army from 10,000 to 35,000 men. Planning to rely on less expensive volunteer forces, it gave the President the right to request 50,000 militia for one year’s service and 100,000 for only six months. The politicians seemed unconcerned that these periods of service would not provide enough time to train recruits properly. Congress also voted down a larger navy and heavy tax increases. These votes meant the nation would not have a fleet to fight the Royal Navy and would have to borrow to pay for the war.

  The uncertainty and confusion of the United States government reflected the deep divisions within the country. The British blockade and impressment of Americans affected mostly the people along the central and northern Atlantic coast. They owned the ships that were being stopped, and it was mainly their men who were being impressed. Yet these same people, particularly in New England, were the ones most fearful of war because they would be exposed to the power of the British navy. Moreover, many of these people made their living from trading and fishing, both of which the British navy could stop.

  The inland and southern regions felt there was little danger to them from British forces. Perhaps their leaders were influenced by a report given early in 1812 to the United States Secretary of War that suggested that conquest would be easy because the British troops in Canada were “much debilitated by intemperance” and the Lower Canadian militia, “the meanest among the refuse of men” was unarmed and “trained only in drunken frolics on common week days.”2 Also, people in those regions believed a successful war would enable them to export freely the products they grew, particularly cotton and tobacco, without interference from British warships. They also looked forward to the final defeat of the Indians.

  When Congress voted on the declaration of war, it was divided: seventy-nine in favour to forty-nine against in the House of Representatives, nineteen to thirteen in the Senate. Opponents came mainly from New England, New York, and New Jersey, with a few from the South and West. This strange mixture of enthusiasm and reluctance for war foretold the tremendous difficulties that President Madison would face. New England not only voted against war but when the struggle came, even helped Britain. State governors would not allow their militia to go beyond their borders, thereby reducing the forces that could be fielded most easily against British North America. New Englanders would not lend money to their federal government — they would and did lend it to the British government. Farmers in New York and Vermont sold supplies to the British army in Canada, greatly helping Canada’s defence. New England’s opposition to the war also meant that there could be no land attack on New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Since the United States did not have a large navy, it could not threaten those colonies from the sea.

  CANADA’S WEAKNESSES

  The Americans could attack the Canadas overland without much difficulty and, probably, with the advantage of surprise. There were differences of opinion among Canadians as to where the greatest danger threatened, but the government was worried only about Upper Canada, and with good reason: the majority of the colony’s population had arrived from the United States after 1791. (These recent arrivals may have numbered over fifty thousand, compared to about thirteen thousand descendants of Loyalists and about fifteen thousand immigrants from Britain.) Would the former Americans defend British rule, or would they welcome American troops? Sir George Prevost, governor of the Canadas, could not be certain, nor could Major-General Isaac Brock, commander of the forces in Upper Canada. In May 1812, Prevost estimated the militia in Upper Canada at eleven thousand but thought only four thousand could be relied on to be loyal.

  In Lower Canada, where there were 49,500 males eligible for militia service, the French-Canadians would have no reason to welcome American invaders. There had been violent quarrels and bad feeling between French-Canadian political leaders and Governor James Craig, but that had changed when Prevost became governor in 1811. Prevost’s ability to speak French, his charm and courtesy, and his political experience, all qualified him to govern the troubled people of Lower Canada. He deliberately set about establishing good relations with French-Canadian leaders and the Roman Catholic Church. As a result, the colony’s assembly would strongly support his efforts to raise money and men for the defence of Lower Canada.

  In 1811, Brock was appointed administrator as well as commanding officer of Upper Canada. This meant he had to look after civil government in place of the lieutenant-governor, Sir Francis Gore, who preferred to be in England and remained there until the war was over. Brock, like Prevost, had to be concerned about civilian as well as military problems.

  The principal military problem in 1812 was the small number of trained soldiers in Canada. There were only about 5,600 British regulars in all. Some 1,400 of these were in Upper Canada, where they had to guard the long frontier and garrison its seven forts as well as St. Joseph, 1,100 kilometres northwest of York. More forces were needed and an obvious source was the manpower of the colonies.

  Already some men were serving as regulars in what were called “fencible” regiments. These were regiments raised among the settlers for local defence and trained to the British army’s standard. An example was the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles which Prevost authorized in December 1811. The government began recruiting Scottish settlers, many of whom had been soldiers, from Glengarry County in Upper Canada, but the need for manpower led to recruiting in the maritime provinces. The other locally raised troops were the Canadian Fencibles, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, the Provincial Corps of Light Infantry (raised among French-Canadians and popularly known as the Canadian Voltigeurs), the Nova Scotia Fencibles and the New Brunswick Fencibles which became 104th Regiment of Foot on the regular establishment. Some of these units would fight in major battles and prove to be effective soldiers.

  These regiments were all formed of volunteers as were the few cavalry corps, such as the Niagara Light Dragoons and the Canadian Light Dragoons. Cavalrymen had to be drawn from prosperous families because they had to provide their own horses. They were expected less to fight than to carry messages and scout the enemy.

  Still more men were needed and, as in the United States, the Canadian government could draw on the militia. By law all males aged 16 to 60 belonged to it and were supposed to attend a few days of training every year. Attendance was generally poor and, in any case, that amount of training was far too little to be of value. This was only the beginning of the militia’s problems, for they lacked virtually everything: weapons, ammunition, uniforms, tents, blankets, food, even boots and cooking pots.

  At first, militia law made no provision for compensating the families of militiamen killed or wounded in action. Brock set out to change this situation by proposing that such families receive land as compensation; this was approved in 1812 by the British government. But while the men were away on militia duty, their families had to look after the farm or business, which meant the burden fell upon the women, children, and old people. During the busiest times — seeding and harvesting — no one could be spared from the farm even if there was a war on. It was essential that the farm work be done in Upper Canada or people would go hungry.

  Not surprisingly, militia in both Canada and the United States were always more concerned about their homes and farms than about military duties. These farmers and townsmen could not be expected to fight with the discipline or courage of regulars. Sometimes they did fight stubbornly, usually when defending their homes (as the Canadians were) rather than when attacking another country (as the Americans were). Fighting in war was the responsibility of the soldiers. Militiamen were meant to perform other duties such as transporting supplies, building roads and fortifications, and guarding prisoners. But the British commanders knew that if the Americans invaded, the Ca
nadian militia would have to fight along with the army and Indians. They therefore set about improving the military ability of the militia.

  In Lower Canada, a new Militia Act was passed in April 1812 providing for a Select Embodied Militia that was to be paid. In Upper Canada, the Militia Act was revised to create unpaid militia flank companies. These changes meant that part of each militia battalion would receive extra training to make them better soldiers. The Select Embodied Militia was made up of men chosen by lot from the Sedentary Militia, whereas the flank companies were composed of volunteers. In 1813 the Volunteer Incorporated Militia was created. Men volunteered to serve in it until the end of the war, received pay, and were promised land grants when the force was disbanded. All these special companies of militia would fight strongly in several major battles.

  The need to use militia who remained civilians created extra problems for Prevost and Brock, for they could not simply give orders to civilians as they could to soldiers. They faced the need to persuade the elected assemblies in Lower and Upper Canada to change the militia laws, to vote money, and to pass other laws to help the war effort.

  Prevost had success with the Assembly of Lower Canada. Besides the new Militia Act, it voted to make a large sum of money available to him. After war broke out, he persuaded the assembly to vote more funds and to guarantee a paper currency called Army Bills. At that time, people believed coins were the only safe money because the gold or silver of the coins had intrinsic value whereas paper money was risky even if backed by the government. However, under the influence of their political and religious leaders, Lower Canadians soon accepted the bills as safe. Prevost used them to buy supplies and pay militia wages, and also sent them to Upper Canada to help its government cover expenses.