The War of 1812 Page 5

  Boats continued to cross bringing reinforcements and taking back wounded as the sky grew brighter and the mist began to disappear. Meanwhile, American cannons above Lewiston battered Queenston with their shot. A British cannon placed halfway up the escarpment in a redan fired back, while another at Vrooman’s Point (over a kilometre north of Queenston) shelled the boats. Even if a boat was not hit directly, it could be damaged and men killed by a cannonball skipping across the water.

  At Fort George, Brock probably heard the noise of battle. He mounted his horse Alfred (given him by Governor Craig) and rode for Queenston telling militia units along the way to follow him. On arrival, he rode to the southern end of the village and may have gone up to the redan when, suddenly, American troops appeared above. Captain Wool had discovered a path leading up the rugged cliff, and his men, as they climbed it to the top, found no guards barring their way. A hail of musket fire drove the artillerymen down the hill, leaving the redan in American hands.

  Brock did not know how long the Americans had been on the heights nor their strength there. He did know that unless he could drive them away and recapture that commanding position, the day could end in American victory.

  In the village, Brock rallied his forces and, sword in hand, led them uphill. Slipping on the wet leaves, the British advanced while the Americans fired from behind trees and logs. Suddenly, one of the enemy stood up, aimed carefully, and fired. The ball hit Brock in the chest and he fell dying to the ground.

  Brock’s aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel John Macdonell, led another charge. It too was thrown back and Macdonell was severely wounded. (He died the next day.) The British retreated, taking Macdonell with them but left Brock’s body in a house in Queenston. They halted a kilometre or two north of the village to await help from Fort George. The Americans now controlled the heights above the village, and no force stood in the way of their advance down the escarpment. But they went no further that day. Despite their dramatic success, they did not gain a victory.

  The Americans failed partly because of poor leadership: their troops were not sure exactly what they were supposed to do and were not given clear orders as the battle unfolded. There was no well-organized system of sending over reinforcements. Many New York militiamen began to claim they could not be forced to leave the state. As well, Captain William Holcroft deployed two six-pounder guns in the village and drove out the invaders while the cannon at Vrooman’s continued firing at the few boats still attempting to cross.

  Probably the main factor preventing a further American advance was the presence of Indians on the heights. These warriors from the Grand River, led by John Norton, skirmished with the Americans among the trees in the area where Brock’s monument now stands on Queenston Heights. The Americans killed and wounded a few natives but did not drive them away, nor try very hard to do so. Some of the militia were so terrified they even tried to re-cross to their own side. Over there, panic ran through the militia ranks. The sight of wounded men being brought back and the sound of Indian war cries ended any desire they had to invade Canada. The American force on the heights, between 1,000 and 1,600 strong, was left on its own.

  American delay gave General Sheaffe time to bring up troops and cannons from Fort George. He took most of his men inland around Queenston and up the escarpment. There he waited for forces from Chippawa. Between 3 and 4 p.m., he was ready with about nine hundred regulars and militia (York, Lincoln, and Captain Runchey’s Company of Coloured Men) plus over two hundred Indians. They charged, and within minutes ended the battle. American losses were heavy: perhaps five hundred killed and wounded and more than nine hundred captured. By comparison, British and Indian casualties — nineteen killed, seventy-seven wounded, and twenty-one missing — were light.

  The battle of Queenston Heights was the last big American attempt to invade Canada in 1812. The British victory gave a tremendous boost to the morale of the defenders. Yet the price was high, for Brock had been killed.

  The Niagara frontier.

  [Reprinted from The War of 1812: The War for Canada, by W.B.

  Turner (Toronto, Grolier Limited, 1982), p. 49.]

  No other British commander inspired as much affection and respect. In the short time between June and October 1812, Brock had proven that the Americans could be beaten, that numbers alone meant nothing. He had set an example of determination to both British and Canadians. Sheaffe actually won the battle, but this achievement was overshadowed by Brock’s foolishly heroic charge that led to his death.

  One reason people came to idealize Brock was the contrast between his leadership and that of his successor. Sheaffe took over as commander of the forces and administrator of Upper Canada. He immediately proposed a three-day truce to allow each side to bury their dead, look after the wounded, and exchange prisoners. There was nothing unusual in making such a truce, but Sheaffe made the mistake of agreeing to continue it when the Americans asked. Many Canadians along the frontier thought this showed weakness and benefitted the Americans, who needed time to reorganize. They believed Sheaffe was willing to abandon Fort Erie and even retreat from the Niagara River. By December, several local leaders had lost confidence in him and put their thoughts in a letter to Prevost. Sheaffe never would be the dynamic, inspiring leader Brock had been.

  Brock dying at the Battle of Queenston Heights

  [Courtesy of the Archives of Ontario, S1 7866b.]

  GENERAL SMYTH’S WAR

  The Americans felt frustrated and discouraged because twice their armies had been beaten and captured by smaller British-Canadian forces. Yet they still had more troops than the defenders and could easily increase their strength. Van Rensselaer resigned the command to Brigadier-General Smyth, who proved even less capable.

  Smyth ended the truce on November 20 as his forces increased to about five thousand men. At the end of the month, he made two separate attempts to invade Canada and bungled both. In the second effort, some 1,500 soldiers climbed into boats but Smyth recalled them before they could even cross the river. The men were wet, cold, tired, and hungry. No wonder some began shooting at the general’s tent! Smyth, complaining that his health was bad, went home. The government did not allow him to return to the army.

  LATE 1812 CAMPAIGNS IN THE CANADAS

  The original American strategy for this year had envisaged a major thrust from Lake Champlain against Montreal and another from Detroit against Upper Canada. But it was not until November that General Dearborn finally attacked Canada. He marched six thousand regulars and militia north from Plattsburgh and they began crossing the border on the 20th. The defenders had plenty of warning. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles de Salaberry led his Canadian Voltigeurs and three hundred Mohawks to meet the enemy. Not far to the rear Major-General Baron Francis de Rottenburg commanded more than five thousand regulars and militia, but they were not needed that day. The Voltigeurs and Indians clashed with the Americans, who became confused and began firing at each other. The Vermont and New York Militia refused to cross the border. Dearborn recalled his troops and retreated to Plattsburgh, ending his campaigning for the year.

  The only promising development for the Americans occurred on Lake Ontario. Captain Isaac Chauncey of the United States Navy arrived at Sackets Harbor in October to take command of American naval efforts on lakes Ontario and Erie. Men and supplies were waiting for him and he set to work to create a strong naval force. By November 8, he was ready with seven warships. He chased the Royal George into Kingston harbour but could not attack it because of the guns on shore. The Royal George, however, had to remain there, and other vessels had to remain at York, until winter ended the navigation season. In effect, Chauncey controlled Lake Ontario at the end of 1812. His force was increased by the launching of the twenty-four-gun Madison on November 26. It was bigger and carried more guns than any other ship on the lake.

  THE WAR AT SEA

  What happened in the Maritime colonies during 1812? Very little. Sherbrooke learned on June 29 of the declaration of w
ar and, at the same time, of the wish of his neighbours in New England to continue normal trade. He issued a proclamation forbidding warfare against New England either on land or sea. But these good neighbourly attitudes did not last.

  In June, the United States government authorized the licensing of privateers and, after President Madison refused to agree to a truce, the British government ordered the same action. This meant that private ship owners could get a licence to arm their vessels and raid enemy shipping. Privateers rarely attacked warships. They preferred the less risky and more profitable merchant ships of the enemy. Captured ships and their cargoes would be sold and the captors would receive a share of the money.

  Both sides made use of privateers because governments would not have to spend money on warships and crews but, instead, could rely on the profit motive to spur ship owners and sailors. The Americans sent out some five hundred privateers, two hundred of whom brought in over 1,300 prizes while, simultaneously, U.S. Navy ships brought in 165. From New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, more than thirty privateers sailed and returned with over two hundred captures. All this warfare interfered with ocean commerce and made some people wealthy but did little to defeat either opponent.9

  Royal Navy warships had begun patrolling the American coast as soon as war was declared. They did not intend to stop all shipping but rather to catch American privateers or warships that sailed out. A few vessels of the small American navy managed to slip past the British patrols and soon began to capture merchant vessels and even British warships. In July, a British squadron failed to catch the U.S. Navy frigate Constitution after chasing it for three days. The next month, the Constitution fought the British frigate Guerriere in the first major sea battle of the war. For over two hours they fired at each other until the Guerriere surrendered. This single-ship victory was followed by others during 1812 and made Americans proud of their navy. It showed that individual ships of the most powerful navy in the world could be beaten. Such victories would not defeat the Royal Navy or win the war, but the successes of the Constitution, the United States, the Essex, and the Wasp contrasted with the miserable failures of American armies.

  THE PEOPLE AND THE WAR

  How had the war affected the people of British North America? Those in the Maritime colonies noticed little difference except an increase in naval and military activity at Halifax — which meant more business for merchants.

  In Lower Canada, more people were affected because Prevost called out the militia. In a few parishes near Montreal some men at first refused to serve, but in general the militia muster proceeded peacefully. Lower Canada suffered no destruction in 1812. Rather, there was increased prosperity for farmers, merchants, and tavern keepers doing business with the British forces.

  It was in Upper Canada that the Americans inflicted property damage and casualties. Neither was great, but the attacks and losses affected the attitudes of the people and government towards the war. At first many people hoped to be neutral or even favoured the Americans. They began to change this view as they experienced invasion and as their militiamen were killed, wounded, or captured.

  Once the fighting began, the Upper Canadian government was able to take stronger action against those who refused to serve in the militia or who declared support for the United States. After the victory at Detroit, Brock proclaimed that any militiaman refusing to take the oath of allegiance would be punished. In November, Sheaffe set up boards to question people who claimed to be United States citizens and, therefore, exempt from military duty. The boards were to decide whether these people would be sent across the border or allowed to remain in Upper Canada.

  Loyal residents of Upper Canada began to express their feelings more openly. In December, the Loyal and Patriotic Society was formed at York to provide winter clothing for the militia. Later in the war, it would give help to people who had suffered from the fighting. It would be supported by donations from Upper Canadians and from people in other colonies and in Britain.

  By the end of 1812 two ideas were developing among Upper Canadians that contributed to a sense of patriotism. One was the regard for Brock as a great “Canadian” hero. The other is known as the “militia myth”: it was the belief that the Canadian militia, rather than British regulars or Indians, were mainly responsible for saving Upper Canada from American conquest. This notion may have arisen as a result of a speech that Reverend John Strachan gave at York:

  It will be told by the future Historian, that the Province of Upper Canada, without the assistance of men or arms, except a handful of regular troops, repelled its invaders, slew or took them all prisoners, and captured from its enemies the greater part of the arms by which it was defended. . . . Our militia . . . have twice saved the country.10

  In reality, the militia’s role in 1812 had been small. Throughout the war, in fact, the militia would be a significant factor in winning battles on only a few occasions. But it was these occasions that Canadians remembered and later exaggerated. Whatever the exact truth, two legends were born in 1812 and would grow to become part of Canadian nationalism.

  No one could have predicted that by the end of 1812 Upper and Lower Canada would survive unconquered; indeed, not only unconquered but also with the inhabitants inspired to greater defensive efforts because several American invasions had been decidedly repulsed. What had looked like overwhelming United States superiority in military manpower supported by many industrial, logistical, and strategic advantages had been astonishingly ill-used or misdirected during 1812. But, in 1813, would this fumbling continue or would the republic gain the victory that seemed so easily within its reach?

  — 3 —

  WAR ON LAND AND SEA, 1813

  In Europe, the year 1812 had ended disastrously for Napoleon. He had invaded Russia but had failed to destroy the Russian army or force the government to surrender. He had captured Moscow, but had found it abandoned and burning. In October, with winter approaching and no way to supply his troops, Napoleon had ordered them back to France. He had taken over 400,000 men into Russia; fewer than 100,000 had survived the appalling conditions of the long march home.

  Leaving the tattered remnants of his retreating Grand Army in December, Napoleon had hurried back to Paris to raise more troops. He remained a strong threat to France’s neighbours and no one could be sure if 1813 would see him again achieve domination of Europe or go down to defeat.

  Except for a brief truce in the summer, the war would drag on through 1813. The greatest battle of the Napoleonic Wars would be fought for three days in October around Leipzig in Germany. Napoleon would be defeated and would retreat to France but still refuse to surrender. This would mean that the war would have to be taken into France itself In Spain, Wellington’s troops (receiving a good deal of their food from New England) would doggedly drive the French northwards to the Franco-Spanish border. Before the end of the year, he would invade France from the south and allied armies would attack across the Rhine River.

  THE BRITISH BLOCKADE THE AMERICAN COAST

  In spite of the continuing demands on Britain for the war in Europe, that country was able to spare more attention and resources to the war in America. During 1813, British naval forces would become more active and aggressive. In January, Admiral John Warren was ordered to raid the American coast, especially around Chesapeake Bay. This area included many rich farms, important towns (including the capital of Washington), and naval bases. It was also an area where desire for war had been very strong. Warren soon imposed a strict blockade all the way from New York to the Gulf of Mexico. His vessels could not stop all United States Navy warships from sailing out, but the Americans won fewer single-ship victories in 1813.

  Still, Americans could be proud of the exploits of the Hornet in the Pacific and of the Argus off the coast of Britain itself. One of the most famous single-ship actions took place in June between the American Chesapeake and the Royal Navy’s Shannon. The Shannon, under Captain Philip Broke, waited for the Chesapeake to come out of Boston
harbour. When she did, the Shannon opened fire and after only eleven minutes the American vessel surrendered. The casualties included Captain James Lawrence of the Chesapeake — who ordered as he died, “Don’t give up the ship!”1 — and Captain Broke, who was seriously wounded. No less than three heroes are remembered from this battle: Lawrence for the Americans, Broke for the British, and Wallis for the Nova Scotians. Provo William Parry Wallis, born in Halifax twenty-two years earlier, was second lieutenant of the Shannon. With the captain wounded and the first lieutenant dead, it fell upon Wallis to take command of the ship and bring her, with the captured Chesapeake, into Halifax harbour where the people lined the shore to cheer both the victory and the man.2 Wallis went on to a glorious career in the navy and ended by becoming an admiral before he died two months short of his 101st birthday! The success of the Shannon showed that Americans could no longer count on winning single-ship battles.

  Much more important was the effect of the blockade, for it strangled American trade. This reduced the amount of taxes collected and therefore the money available to the American government for fighting the war. One estimate puts the income from customs revenue, the government’s main source, at one-tenth of its prewar level.3 By the end of 1813, the United States was facing bankruptcy as well as serious internal disunity as states in New England showed increasing hostility to supporting the war.

  Naval power thus played an important part in the war in more ways than one.

  The Attack on York 27 April 1813.

  [Reprinted from The Defended Border, by Morris Zaslow (Toronto,

  Macmillan of Canada, 1964), p. 255.]

  THE WAR ON THE INLAND LAKES