The War of 1812 Read online

  THE WAR OF 1812

  Sir Isaac Brock.

  (Courtesy of Brock University.)

  THE WAR OF 1812

  The War That

  Both Sides Won

  WESLEY B. TURNER

  Second Edition

  Copyright © Wesley B. Turner 2000

  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise (except for brief passages for purposes of review) without the prior permission of Dundurn Press. Permission to photocopy should be requested from the Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency.

  Editor: Barry Jowett

  Design: Jennifer Scott

  Printer: Friesens Corporation

  Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

  Turner, Wesley B., 1933-

  The War of 1812: the war that both sides won

  2nd ed.

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  ISBN 1-55002-336-5

  1. Canada — History — War of 1812 2. United States — History — War of 1812. I. Title

  FC442.T873 2000 971.03’4 C00-930048-1 E359.85.T87 2000

  1 2 3 4 5 04 03 02 01 00

  We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts, the Ontario Arts Council, and the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP) for our publishing activities.

  Care has been taken to trace the ownership of copyright material used in this book. The author and the publisher welcome any information enabling them to rectify any references or credit in subsequent editions.

  J. Kirk Howard, President

  Printed and bound in Canada.

  Printed on recycled paper.

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  — TABLE OF CONTENTS —

  PREFACE

  PREFACE to the Second Edition

  INTRODUCTION

  CHAPTER 1: Background to War, 1802–1812

  CHAPTER 2: A Surprising War, 1812

  CHAPTER 3: War on Land and Sea, 1813

  CHAPTER 4: Checks and Stalemates, 1814

  CHAPTER 5: Out of War to a Long Peace

  APPENDIX: Weapons of Period Armies and Navies

  NOTES

  CHRONOLOGY

  SELECTED FURTHER READING

  INDEX

  To my wife, Diane

  — PREFACE —

  Tragedy and farce, bravery and cowardice, intelligence and foolishness, sense and nonsense: these contrasts and more characterized the War of 1812. The story is interesting in itself. And this interest continues to be renewed by current discoveries that further illuminate the period: for example, the discovery in 1975 and subsequent photographing of the Hamilton and Scourge at the bottom of Lake Ontario, and the 1987 find of skeletons on the shore of Lake Erie at Snake Hill, grisly casualties of the fighting around Fort Erie in August–September 1814. As these finds and a constant flow of writings show, the war has exercised an indelible influence on American and Canadian views of themselves and of each other — a further reason for taking yet another look at its course and character.

  This book derives from my The War of 1812: The War for Canada, a book that was written as a school text but that also elicited interest and led to requests for copies. The supply of books was never enough to meet these requests and, after the original work went out of print, I decided to revise it for the general reader rather than simply reprint a textbook.

  The book was written to provide a succinct yet comprehensive account of the War of 1812 that would both interest and inform the general reader. At the same time, historians may find this a useful, short, up-to-date version of that formative event. I did not attempt a radical or unusual interpretation. Instead I have included more than a single viewpoint with the intention of providing enjoyment to both American and Canadian readers out of which, perhaps, they may gain some understanding of the important effects this war had on each country.

  — PREFACE —

  to the Second Edition

  The War of 1812 has produced a literary explosion over the past decade. In the years since this book was first published, more than twenty scholarly works dealing directly with the subject have appeared, as have four others that relate to it less directly and several guidebooks. Of course, I may have missed some titles and I am not counting journal or magazine articles. Nor am I including books that I know are underway but not yet published.

  In light of this outburst of fresh and deeper insights, I decided that my War of 1812. The War That Both Sides Won would benefit from a reassessment. The recent literature challenges some of the established scholarly interpretations of the war and I have tried to incorporate some of the new ideas and information in the revision.

  These writings also provide fuller explorations of campaigns, battles, the naval contest on the Great Lakes, and personnel. There seems to be less nationalist bias and stronger effort to see the other side’s point of view. To assist the reader to become acquainted with some of the new literature, I have expanded the selected bibliography. The titles you see there indicate the wealth of writing and some of the leading authors in the field.

  I am much indebted to the staff of Parks Canada at Fort George, and to David Webb in particular, for their assistance with this revision. I am happy also to thank Kirk Howard for his support and Barry Jowett for clarifying much of my text through his expert editing.

  WBT

  Niagara-on-the-Lake, October 1999

  — INTRODUCTION —

  In June 1812 the contagion of war spread far beyond the European continent where it had raged for two decades from the early years of the French Revolution. In the United States, President James Madison delivered a war message to Congress on June 1 and, after approval by both Houses, signed a declaration of war against Great Britain on the 18th. A week later, thousands of kilometres to the east, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte led the most powerful army in Europe across the Niemen River into Russia. The obvious difference in scale of warfare and the great distance between these two theatres does not obscure the connection between these two events. The Napoleonic Wars in Europe did not only help cause the war in North America; they would directly affect its entire course. It may be said that the War of 1812 was the North American phase of the Napoleonic Wars.

  In an effort to defeat Napoleon, Britain adopted measures that elicited protests from the Americans and contributed significantly to their declaration of war. At first, with its forces tied up fighting the French in the Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) Britain could send little help to its North American colonies. But Napoleon’s invasion of Russia turned into a stunning disaster that virtually destroyed his “Grand Army.” He raised more troops and fought on, but suffered an increasing number of defeats. The wearing down of the French armies enabled Britain to spare more attention, troops, and supplies for North America. Once Napoleon finally surrendered, the United States could no longer hope to win its war against Britain.

  One historian has called the War of 1812 the “Incredible War,” and there were indeed many incredible aspects to it — including the very fact that it happened. Britain and the United States had more reasons to remain at peace than to fight.

  In the summer of 1812 the outcome of such a war seemed obvious to many Americans, Canadians, and Britons. There appeared no possib
ility that Upper Canada could successfully resist American invasion. After its fall, the easy conquest of Lower Canada would follow, although the British might hold on to Quebec City. But this anticipated course of the war did not happen. Something else that was unexpected was the success of individual American warships in sea battles with British warships. Surely the oddest aspect is that both sides believe they won the war.

  If the beginning and course did not meet expectations, neither did the peace treaty. The Treaty of Ghent ignored most of the reasons that President Madison had given for starting the conflict. It appeared that the treaty did not settle the problems bedeviling Anglo-American relations, yet the basic principles of this agreement of December 1814 have endured to the present.

  The Napoleonic Wars in Europe dragged on for years (from 1792 to 1815 with some gaps) and often involved huge armies fighting long battles and suffering terrible losses. By contrast, the War of 1812 lasted two and a half years and was fought by tiny armies and navies in short engagements. Wellington’s casualties at Waterloo (fifteen thousand) were virtually equal to the total combined casualties suffered by the two sides fighting in North America. Does all this mean that the War of 1812 lacks importance and really deserves no more than passing attention? Not at all. The war was brief but its scope was continent-wide, for it ranged from the eastern seaboard of the United States to the mouth of the Columbia River on the Pacific coast and from Lake Superior to the Gulf of Mexico. The American Adjutant General later estimated that there had been more than 500,000 enlistments in various American forces during the war, a figure that represented 47 percent of the white male population between the ages of 16 and 45.1 This suggests that the experience of enlistment was widespread and affected many families.

  The War of 1812 changed the lives of many Canadians and Americans. It significantly influenced the development of each country. The curious little war provides a fundamental reason for Canada’s existence as a nation today and still affects what being Canadian means. The United States was perhaps less profoundly affected, but afterwards, there was an increased pride in the nation and a feeling of greater security because both the British and the Indian threats had been eliminated from the northeast.

  Finally, the war brought no victory or benefit to the native peoples south and west of Lake Erie. To them this was not a little or insignificant war, but a war of survival, and by 1814 they could see that they had lost.

  — 1 —

  BACKGROUND TO WAR, 1802-1812

  Napoleon created a sprawling empire in Europe between 1802 and 1812 through military conquest and alliances. But his ability to extend his power beyond the continent ended in 1805 when Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar. From that point on, the Royal Navy stood between Napoleon and invasion across the Channel. He could not assault the fortress of Britain nor could he prevent the British from sending armies to support his enemies on the continent. Napoleon therefore turned to the only weapon left by which he might hope to defeat the “nation of shopkeepers”: economic warfare.

  In November 1806, Napoleon ordered all European ports under his control closed to British ships. Later he decreed that neutral ships would be seized if they visited a British port before entering a continental port. Britain replied with a series of Orders in Council. These required all neutral ships to enter British ports and obtain a licence before they could sail to Europe. Neutrals had to obey French decrees or British orders. What choice could a ship’s master make? It was Britain that had the seapower to enforce its blockade and require neutral ships to obey its rules. The most important neutral nation trading with Europe was the United States. British interference with American ships would help bring on the War of 1812.

  Eastern North America, 1812

  [Reprinted from The War of 1812: The War for Canada, by

  W.B. Turner (Toronto, Grolier Limited, 1982), p. 9.]

  BRITISH NORTH AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

  On the eve of the war, Britain’s North American colonies stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the western end of Lake Erie and the shores of Lake Huron. Their populations were growing steadily but slowly. Lower Canada (later Quebec province) had about 270,000 people; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia had perhaps 80,000; and estimates for Upper Canada (Ontario) range from 60,000 to 80,000.

  The smaller populations of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and Cape Breton brought the total to something over half a million. Numbers are only part of the story, for the inhabitants were scattered, living mostly on farms. Towns were small and industries few. These colonies possessed scanty means of making war.

  When war threatened, it quickly became clear that Upper Canada was the most vulnerable of the colonies. The biggest problem was transportation. Roads were few and those that did exist were dreadful: deeply rutted sticky mud in the spring thaw and whenever rain fell. Even in dry weather holes, tree stumps and unbridged rivers discomforted and delayed travellers. Transportation by water was better, but rapids on the St. Lawrence River prevented ships sailing the three hundred kilometres from Montreal to Kingston. A few canals had been built around these obstacles, but only small, flat-bottomed boats (bateaux) could navigate through them. At the rapids, goods had to be taken off the boats and carried around. The journey took several days. Travel was easier and faster west of Kingston because ships could sail to York (now Toronto) and Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake). To go farther required another portage from Queenston up the Niagara River along the Portage Road to Chippawa. Sailing ships could then take people and goods to the few small settlements that dotted Lake Erie’s shores.

  Upper Canada was too weak to defend itself. Its small population was scattered along the 1,300 kilometres from Cornwall on the St. Lawrence to Amherstburg on Lake Erie. The people did not grow all the food nor did they make all the goods they needed. With their own resources, they could not provide an army or even support British troops. Help from Britain in the form of men, money, supplies, and ships was essential.

  All these defence needs depended on a route that the Americans could easily cut. They had only to march an army north and block the St. Lawrence south of Montreal, and Upper Canada would fall into their hands without their even having to fight there. The British government and the authorities in Canada were always very concerned about the safety of the route from Montreal to Amherstburg.

  The United States, with its rapidly growing population of almost 7.5 million was clearly much stronger than Canada. Settlers were filling up New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, moving ever closer to the Canadian border. Along the Niagara River, pioneer communities like Buffalo, Black Rock, and Lewiston were still small, but roads connected them with well-populated areas to the east and south. Not far distant were rich farms and expanding cities with factories. The American population could provide thousands of soldiers, and the farms and factories could supply most of their needs. American supply routes ran overland and out of easy range of British forces.

  Farther west in Pennsylvania, Ohio and the Michigan Territory, roads were so few that travel was mostly by river or along forest paths. These routes were not only more difficult but also more vulnerable to sudden Indian attack.

  INDIANS OF THE NORTHWEST

  Indians had been resisting the advance of American settlement in the Old Northwest (south of Lake Erie, north of the Ohio River) since the 1780s. Nonetheless, thousands of Americans moved into the area every year, raising Ohio’s population to over 230,000 people and Kentucky’s to about 400,000 by 1810. These settlers wanted to drive out the Indians in order to farm the land.

  A Shawnee leader, the Prophet (Tenskwatawa), recognized that disunity among the tribes was the principal weakness of his people. Beginning in 1805, he tried to organize a confederacy of all the Indian tribes in the territories threatened by advancing American settlement. After 1808, his older brother, the war chief Tecumseh, became increasingly prominent and traditionally has be given the major credit for organizing Indian resistance to the Am
ericans.

  Cartoon depicting British/Indian relations.

  [Courtesy of Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington,

  Indiana.]

  On its own, a tribe could be forced to surrender its lands or be bribed into trading them away. Between 1803 and 1809, Governor William Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory did this repeatedly with Indians south and west of Lake Erie. Sometimes two tribes claimed the same lands and there would be conflict between them. Only by uniting, Tecumseh and the Prophet insisted, could the Indians settle quarrels among themselves and be strong enough to resist American pressure. They urged Indians to rely on their own abilities to create a great Indian nation instead of adopting the white man’s ways. But until such a state came into being, they needed allies, and looked for help to the British in Canada. Many Indians had supported the British side in the American Revolution and as an aftermath of that war, some of the Iroquois, the Miamis, the Shawnees, and other tribes had been trying to establish an Indian state south and west of Lake Erie. In such a state Indians would control their own lives and land. American settlers would not be able to move in whenever they wanted.

  The British government supported this idea of an Indian state because it would provide a buffer for Upper Canada. While few British immigrants were coming to the province, many Americans were. The government feared that if many more moved in, they might become strong enough to pressure the American government into attempting to annex Upper Canada. This danger would be lessened considerably if there were Indian-held territory along the Canadian border.

  Fur traders also supported the idea of an Indian state. They wanted to continue trading with the Indians around the Great Lakes and to the west. But the advance of American settlement was steadily (and, as it turned out, permanently) ending the fur trade. The traders and their Indian allies would play an important role in the war to come.